When 12 senators voted in 1991 to end the presence of US military bases in the Philippines, many saw it as a defining assertion of national sovereignty.
The vote, which rejected a treaty that would have extended the stay of American forces at Subic and Clark, marked a turning point in Philippine foreign policy. It was widely viewed in contemporary accounts as a break from the country’s long military relationship with the United States, though critics warned it could weaken external defense capabilities.
Thirty-five years later, the Philippines is expanding defense cooperation not only with the United States, its lone treaty ally, but also with other like-minded nations, reflecting a broader shift in how sovereignty and security are pursued.
The country’s modern defense posture has been shaped by its postwar alliance with the United States, formalized through the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforced by the presence of American bases at Clark and Subic.
The closure of those facilities in 1991 reshaped Manila’s approach to external defense, as it retained its treaty alliance with Washington while gradually rebuilding security cooperation through mechanisms such as the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and expanded joint military exercises.
The Philippine Senate officially concurred in the ratification of the VFA on May 27, 1999.
Today, defense cooperation has widened beyond the United States, with Manila deepening engagement with regional partners through exercises, maritime cooperation, and security dialogues.
Interconnected environment
For geopolitical analyst Don McLain Gill, sovereignty remains the foundation of statehood but cannot be secured in isolation.
Gill is a lecturer at the Department of International Studies at De La Salle University, where his research focuses on Philippine foreign policy, maritime security and Indo-Pacific geopolitics. He is also an Indo-Pacific research fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and a nonresident fellow at the Stratbase ADR Institute.
“Sovereignty is the bedrock of our existence as a nation-state,” Gill told the Inquirer. “It is what makes us who we are.”
He said sovereignty must be understood in the context of an increasingly interconnected security environment, where states face external threats that require cooperation and assistance from like-minded parties.
“Security cannot merely be an endeavor of an individual state,” he said. “This is where cooperation comes into play.”
Gill said defense partnerships should be viewed as instruments for advancing national interests rather than constraints on them.
“No other country is there to look after Philippine national interest but us,” he said.
The long-term implications of the 1991 decision remain part of ongoing debate in Philippine foreign policy.
In the years that followed, attention shifted to tensions in the South China Sea.
In 1995, China built structures on Mischief (Panganiban) Reef in the Spratly Islands, within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, prompting protests from Manila and raising maritime security concerns in the region.
Gill pointed to such developments as part of the evolving strategic environment facing the Philippines, underscoring the need for diplomacy, deterrence, and external partnerships in addressing West Philippine Sea disputes.
He cautioned against framing Philippine foreign policy in binary terms, noting broader geopolitical pressures that are shaping the region.
Expanding partnerships
While the United States remains the Philippines’ only treaty ally, Manila has broadened its network of security partnerships in recent years.
Defense cooperation has expanded with Japan, Australia, South Korea, India, and others through joint exercises, capacity-building programs, and maritime security initiatives.
Gill said this diversification gives the Philippines greater flexibility in pursuing national interests.
“We are widening the options for the Philippines to explore various facets of security cooperation and development,” he said.
He added that security cooperation now extends beyond traditional defense concerns, as economic resilience, technology, and defense industrial cooperation become increasingly linked to security planning.
“The gap between traditional security and economic cooperation has been narrowing,” he said.
As a result, partnerships now include not only exercises and training but also discussions on capability-building and modernization.
The Philippines has also expanded its network of defense cooperation agreements beyond its long-standing Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, signing Status of Visiting Forces Agreements with Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and France.
It has also concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, creating legal frameworks for joint exercises, rotational deployments, and deeper military interoperability with partner forces.
National interest as basis
Gill said the Philippines operates in an increasingly complex security environment where cooperation with other states has become necessary to address external threats.
Tensions in the West Philippine Sea, geopolitical competition, and military modernization across the Indo-Pacific have reshaped defense planning in Manila.
He said the challenge is not whether to engage partners, but how to ensure these relationships remain aligned with national interests.
“We cooperate on the basis of national interest,” he said.
Gill stressed that partnerships are most effective when they are institutionalized and sustained beyond political cycles, allowing capabilities to build over time rather than through short-term arrangements.
For the analyst, independence is not defined by isolation, but by the ability of the state to pursue national interests through strategic choices in a shifting regional environment.
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He said the key challenge is ensuring that partnerships remain functional tools for advancing those interests, rather than symbolic arrangements.
